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THE ACCUMULATION CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE
For the greater part of the 1980s, agriculture in South A-frica
has been in crisis. Arguably this crisis is likely to be the most
prolonged and the accompanying restructuring the most fundamental
since the Marketing Act o-f 1937 and the Land Acts o-f 1913 and
1936 laid down the foundations o-f the present structure. For a
sector that is still the second largest employer of black labour,
that is the source of the most essential of wage goods, and that
provides the backbone of the rural economy, the potential
importance of this crisis not only for agriculture, but the
structure, level and distribution of activity in the economy as a
whole, needs no stressing.
This article explores
the symptoms (and nature) of the crisis
the causes, immediate and underlying
and the implications for agriculture itself and for the
economy at large .
The focus is on commercial agriculture - referred to simply as
'agriculture' unless otherwise indicated.
1. SYMPTOMS AND NATURE OF CRISIS
The ability to accumulate capital depends on a number of factors.
In the first instance, it is a function of profitability. But
this is not all that matters: to be able to 'stay in business'
and continue to accumulate, firms need both to remain 'liquid',
i.e. able to meet their short-term obligations, and, ultimately,
to remain 'solvent', i.e. able to cover all their liabilities to
outside parties on the sale of their assets.
Failure to make profits can be sustained, in the short run, by a
reduction in the owners' capital (or 'equity* as it is sometimes
called) and/or by an increase in borrowed capital, i.e. debt.
Consistent failure to make profits will generally result in
insolvency and the winding up of a firm. Failure to remain
sufficiently liquid can also be sustained, for a period, by
increasing borrowings, but this makes a firm vulnerable to being
wound up at any moment at the discretion of its creditors,
whether or not it is insolvent.
The degree to which capital is being accumulated by a firm is
measured by the growth or decline in the value of its capital
assets, while the degree to which its owners are accumulating
capital is gauged by the change in the 'net worth' of the firm,
i.e. total assets minus total debt. Both measures need to be
adjusted to eliminate the effects of inflation if a true or
'real' indication of the rate of accumulation is to be obtained.
Though Marx's notion of profit may differ from conventional
accounting measures, it is in terms of the latter that one is
usually obliged to assess the process of accumulation of
capitalist firms - the data needed to do it by any other method
are not often available. Likewise, the ideal in assessing the
performance of an entire economic sector, such as agriculture,
would be to break it down by sub-sector and region, but the data
are seldom available. Table 1 sets out the essential information
for a conventional analysis of accumulation in agriculture as a
whole in South Africa between 1970 and 1988. Where available,
additional fragmentary findings are referred to, to give the
overall picture some regional and sub-sectoral flavour.
1•1 Profitabilitv
The profitability of farming can be assessed in various ways, the
most basic of which is 'net farming profit'.. The data in Table 1
(col.6) show a rising trend through the 1970s until 1981,
followed by a decline in 1982 and 1983, and then a gradual
recovery until the 1981 peak was passed in 1986.
However, this measure does not take into account the resources
applied to achieve these returns. A more comprehensive measure
which reflects the latter is:
net return on assets (investment) = net farming income
value of capital assets
Line 1 in Table 2 records the net return on assets between 1970
and 1988. The pattern is very similar to that of net farming
profit: from a 5,5% starting point in 1970, the return climbed to
11,4% in 1981, fell to a low of 5,3% in 1983, and then rose
steadily to a new peak of 12,1% in 1988.
The valuation of capital - on which the calculation of the net
return on assets depends - is no simple task. Analysis of the
estimates of the stock of agricultural capital made by the RSA
Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, shows that
the basis of the calculation was revised in a number of ways
between 1978 and 1982. Each of these revisions had the effect of
understating the value of capital assets in the later period
relative to the earlier period, though it is hard to say which
part of the series is the more reliable. Appendix A elaborates.
In respect of the net return on assets, this suggests that the
data in Table 2 (line 1) are relative overestimates for the 1980s
rates of return that were achieved in the late 70s, while the
'trough' reached in 1983 is likely to have been a good deal
lower than the rates of return in the 70s .
Perhaps the most refined indicator is:
net return on owners' equity = net farming profit
capital assets - total debt
(see Table 2, line 3.) This most accurately reflects the return
to farmers on the capital they have invested. Though both the
trend and the level are very similar to that of net return on
assets up to 1981, the low to which net return on owners'
equity fell in 1983 was considerably lower (2,7% as against
5,3%), and the recovery thereafter was slower. The immediate
reasons for this divergence - the increased reliance on borrowed
capital and the rise in the interest rate payable on borrowings -
are discussed below. The qualifications made in respect of the
estimates of the rate of return on assets apply equally to the
rate of return on owners' equity, and the conclusions that follow
fABLE 1: INCOME AND EXPENDITURE, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF AGRICULTURE.
year
19 70
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Sources
1
gross
farming
income
1265
2833
5882
7104
7496
7122
8533
9270
11513
13696
15366
and Notes
SOUTH AFRICA,
2
expend, on
intermed.
goods
services
418
906
2213
2658
3192
3410
3575
4144
4775
5242
6028
: Appendix B
1970-1988.
3
expend, on
salaries
wages, rent
depreciation
337
458
887
1075
1352
1791
2012
1661
2185
2456
2728
4
net
farming
income
l-(2+3)
510
1469
2782
3371
2952
1921
2946
3465
4553
5998
6610
5
interest
payments
74
134
323
545
785
1074
1344
1698
1585
1650
1700
6
net
farming
profit
4-5
436
1335
2459
2826
2167
847
1602
1767
2968
4348
4910
7
value of
capital
assets
9202
16974
28579
29574
33053
36259
38709
42067
45879
49783
54463
8
short
term
debt
395
702
1668
2184
2967
4034
5203
6069
6517
6980
n .a.
9
total
debt
1402
2 004
3839
4839
5786
7409
9495
11118
12431
13286
(14000)
TABLE AGRICULTURAL FINANCIAL INDICATORS, 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 8 .
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
indicator
net nominal return
on assets (%)
net real return
on assets (%)
net nominal return
on owners equity(%)
net real return
on owners equity(%)
net worth (Rm)
C.P.I.
inflation rate (%)
real net worth (Rm)
real capital
stock (Rm)
debt burden (%)
short-term debt (%)
average nominal
interest rate (%)
average real
interest rate (%}
net farm profit:
short-term debt
capital:output
ratio
Table 1
col.ref
4/7
note
6/7-9
note
7-9
note
note
note
note
9/7
8/9
5/9
note
6/8
7/1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1970
5,5
0,2
5,6
0,3
7800
36,1
5,3
21814
25698
15,2
28,2
5,3
0,0
1,10:1
7,27:1
1975
8,7
-4,8
7,4
-6,1
14970
56,6
13,5
22985
26526
11,8
35,0
6,7
-6,8
1,90:1
5,99:1
1980
9,7
-3,4
9,9
-3,2
24740
100,0
13,1
24740
28579
13,4
43,4
8,4
-4,7
1,47:1
4,86:1
1981
11,4
-3,8
11,4
-3,8
24735
115,2
15,2
20604
24805
16,3
45,1
11,3
-3,9
1,29:1
4,16:1
1982
8,9
-5,8
7,9
-6,8
27267
132,1
14,7
20752
25132
17,5
51,3
13,6
-1,1
0,73:1
4,41:1
1983
5,3
-7,0
2,9
-9,4
28850
148,4
12,3
19826
24829
20,4
54,4
14,5
-2,2
0,21:1
5.09:1
1984
7,6
-9,1
5,4
-11,3
29214
165,7
16,7
18962
24692
24,5
54,8
14,2
-2,5
0,31:1
4,54:1
1985
8,2
-8,0
5,7
-10,5
30949
192,6
16,2
19656
2 5429
26,4
54,6
15,3
-0,9
0,29:1
4,54:1
1986
9,9
-8,7
8,8
-9,8
33448
228,5
18,6
19927
25367
27,1
52,4
12,8
-5,8
0,46:1
3,98:1
1987
12,0
-4,1
11,9
-4,2
36497
265,3
16,1
20219
25227
26,7
52,5
12,4
-3,7
0,62:1
3,63:1
19 8 ..
12,1
-0,4
(12,1)
(-0,4)
(40463)
298,5
12,5
n .a.
n .a.
(25,7)
n.a.
(12,1)
(0,4)
n.a.
3,54:1
Sources and Notes: Appendix B
are similiar.
At -first glance, these rates of return, though clearly low in
'bad* years such as 1983, do not seem to represent an
unsatis-factory record •from the point of view of -farmers and
indirect investors, even taking into account the relative
overstatement in the 1980s. However, they conceal at least two
important sets o-f indicators, namely, variations by sub-sector
and region, and returns net of inflation. Information by sub-
sector and region is not readily available, but from the negative
net -farming income received by -field-crop farmers in the Transvaal
and Orange Free State and by meat-producers in the Transvaal in
1983, it can be seen that important sub-sectors and regions have,
at times, actually experienced negative nominal rates of return
while the return to agriculture as a whole has still been positive
(SA Agricultural Union, 1984: 51).
The rates of return in lines 1 and 3 of Table 2 are expressed in
nominal terms. When calculated in real terms - net of inflation
- with the exception of 1970, they are all found to be negative,
the more so when the estimates are adjusted for the relative
undervaluation of capital in the 1980s. Lines 2 and 4 set out the
details. Were net real return on owners' equity the sole
criterion, the average farmer would have been well advised to
sell up and reinvest in the another sector. In practice, for
most, hidden returns in the form of salaries received out of
current income, lifestyle and the nominal appreciation of capital
assets accompanying inflation, were sufficient attraction to
retain their investment in agriculture.
Perhaps the most important impact of these trends has been on the
real stock of capital in agriculture. The series in Table 2 (line
9) shows a significant rise (of about 11%) during the 1970s
before a sharp drop in 1981 followed by narrow fluctuation during
the rest of 1980s. However, the analysis in Appendix A suggests
that much of the rise in the 70s should be discounted if all of
the data are to be compared on a consistent basis. It therefore
appears- that the total real capital stock in agriculture has
remained substantially the same for most of the past two decades.
Moreover, to maintain this level of the capital stock, farmers in
the 1980s have had to rely increasingly on borrowed capital.
Line 10 of Table 2 shows the extent of the increase in the burden
of farmers' debt: whereas in 1975, debt constituted 11,8 % of the
value of farming assets, by 1986 this had risen to 27,1%. Though
part of this increase must be discounted because of the relative
undervaluation o-f capital in the 1980s, the escalating dependence
on loans from outside parties is clear. Farmers have become
either unwilling or unable to retain the proportion of the
capital stock that they owned in previous years.
There is some evidence that farmers have become less willing to
maintain the relative level of their involvement in agriculture.
Data collected by the SAAU in 1984 showed that the proportion
of farmers* assets held in non-agricultural investments increased
from 8,3% in 1970 to 13,9%, valued at R6441 m, in 1983 (1984:
34). The average annual growth rate of investments outside
agriculture during this period was 16,7% as against 12,57. for
investments in farming. Though this could have been caused merely
by a more rapid rate of appreciation of non-farming investments,
the SAAU concluded that it was largely the result of an increase
In the number of part-time -farmers, 45% of whose assets were
located outside agriculture in 1983 (1984: 34-37). Some active
diversification has therefore taken place.
But other factors have also played a role. Fiske (1988, personal
communication) points out that credit has, until recently, been
readily available to farmers at lower than market rates, while
the returns to be had on investments in agriculture have
generally been below those obtainable elsewhere. It has therefore
paid farmers to borrow cheaply and invest in beach-cottages,
town-houses, insurance policies, share portfolios and so an - not
directly with borrowed funds, but with internal funds which could
otherwise have been- used for farming purposes.
A second more powerful argument suggesting that farmers may have
become less willing to retain as large a share of the
agricultural capital stock, could be mounted around the
surprisingly steep decline in the capital:output ratio, which
measures the value of capital required to produce each rand's
worth of output. From 7,27:1 in 1970, the capital:output ratio
(calculated at the current values recorded by the Department of
Agricultural Economics and Marketing) fell to 4,16:1 in 1981, and
then rose somewhat before finishing at 3,54:1 in 1988 - less than
half the starting ratio at the beginning of the 1970s (see Table
2, line 15). This would indicate a declining need for capital in
farming. Together with the poor rates of return on agricultural
capital described above, it would therefore appear to have been
rational for farmers to transfer capital from agricultural to
non-agricultural investments.
In fact, it is probable that the capital:output ratio did not
fall as rapidly as the figures in Table 2 indicate. There are two
main strands to the explanation. The first is the relative
undervaluation of capital starting in 1978 and growing in
disproportion until 1982, when the procedure for valuation
resumed some stabilty. (Appendix A gives details.) This accounts
to some degree for the considerable drop in the capital:output
ratio in the late 70s. Thereafter, the greater part of
fluctuations in the ratio can be explained by corresponding
fluctuations in weather patterns.
The second strand concerns the rapid increase in the application
of intermediate inputs. Real expenditure on fertilizers, seeds,
pesticides, herbicides, fuel, etc. rose by about 50% between 1970
and 1982, when the drought began. Real output, between 1970
and 1981, grew just a little more than commensurately. During the
80s, the relationship between the two has remained close, though
modified by the drought.
Together, the two explanations suggest that the substantial fall
in the capital:output ratio is more apparent than real - accounted
for, on the one hand, by statistical aberation, and on the other,
by the omission of growing inputs of working capital.If so, the
argument that farmers became less willing to invest in
agriculture because of the declining requirement for capital,
should not be overemphasized.
Conversely, there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that growing
•financial pressures sapped the ability o-f most -farmers to fund
capital needs -from internal sources, making it difficult to avoid
the accumulation of debt. The evidence is provided by an analysis
o-f debt and liquidity trends in agriculture.
1-2 Liguidj.t.2
The particularly rapid build-up o-f debt in 1983 and 1984 -focuses
attention on liquidity as a measure o-f -financial health.
Liquidity, it will be recalled, is the capacity to repay short-
term debt at short notice. The two most common measures of
liquidity are:
'current ratio' : current assets
current liabilities
and,
•liquidity ratio' :cash. marketable securities, receivables
current liabilities
The rule of thumb in general use (Helfert, 1967: 59) and adopted
by the SAAU (1984: 79) is that these ratios should not be below
2:1 and 1:1 respectively. Of the two, the SAAU considers the
liquidity ratio - popularly referred to as the 'acid test' - to
reflect the true position of farmers more accurately (1984: 80).
Data that would make the annual calculation of these ratios
possible are hard to come by. The best approximation of the
trend, though not of the level, of the liquidity ratio is:
Net farming profit (See Table 1, line IS)
short-term debt
This is, in practice, the liquidity ratio, omitting the non-
farming liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) in the
numerator, since by far the largest 'receivable' is net farming
profit. Table 2 shows a marked deterioration in this ratio
between 1975 and I960, which becomes quite dramatic thereafter,
reaching a low point of 0,21:1 in 1983.
The financial survey conducted by the SAAU in 1983 allows . the
accurate calculation of both the liquidity ratio and the current
ratio for that year. While the average current ratio for farmers
as a whole stood at 1,70:1 -'significantly less than the
acceptable level - the liquidity ratio was on average only 0,32:1
- less than one third of what is satisfactory (SAAU, 1984: 80).
Just one region, the Eastern Cape, was able to show a liquidity
ratio above the safe minimum. Others, including the key
Transvaal and Orange Free State regions, were as low as 0,17:1.
This indicates an acute degree of illiquidity. Farmers with
strong cash and marketable security reserves might have been able
to meet their short-term obligations by drawing on these
reserves. But by 1983, few farmers had such reserves.(To some
extent, this has been encouraged, at least in the major grain
sectors, by the ready availability of Land Bank finance for short
term needs through cooperatives.) Consequently, most farmers were
obliged to borrow -further to honour their short-term debts. In
most instances, this borrowing took the form of the
'consolidation' of existing short-term debt, that is, an
extension, normally by a year or more, of the period for
repayment of such debt. This effectively converts short-term
debt to medium or long-term. By 1986, more than a quarter of the
total debt of crop farmers in the summer rainfall region
consisted of 'hard-core*, normally short-term, debts Df this
nature (Potgieter, 1987: 5).
Perhaps the greatest problem created by this form of financing is
that it increases the burden of interest payments, making it more
difficult for farmers to generate sufficient income to cover
their short-term costs and repay loans. It is for this reason
that the threshhold of insolvency is reckoned to be much lower
than the actual level of debt which signifies insolvency (see
below).
Acute illiquidity in the period from 1982 onwards, is thus a
substantial - though by no means the only - cause of the rapid
movement of many farmers towards insolvency. Furthermore, the
combination of increased debt and high interest rates has helped
turn illiquidity into a chronic problem, prevalent even in years
of relatively good returns (see results for 1986 and 1987 in
Table 2). It will take not one but several years of high net
income to reestablish an acceptable level of liquidity.
1.3 Solvency;
In terms of the ultimate debt criterion, solvency, the overall
position of the agricultural sector is still sound. The rule of
thumb for financial health in this respect is that total debt
should not exceed half of the value of total assets (SAAU
1984: 72). As line 10 of Table 2 shows, the average debt burden
(total debt / total assets), which has been rising continuously
since 1975, still stood at about 27% in 1986 and 1987, although
some part of this rise should be discounted because of the
relative undervaluation of capital in the 1980s. Nevertheless,
as far back as 1983, when the average debt burden was
considerably lower (18,9%), many farmers were at or beyond the
critical level. The SAAU records that the average debt burden of
the 15200 farmers most seriously in debt in that year was exactly
50% (1984: 78). Assuming a normal distribution, this would have
place at least 11% Df farmers in immediate danger of insolvency.
And, as is pointed out below, the situation appears to have
deteriorated substantially since then.
However, solvency an its own is no guarantee of financial
stability. As the level of debt grows, it becomes increasingly
difficult for farmers to cover their interest payments and repay
loan capital. Beyond a certain point - usually much lower than
the critical level for solvency - it is reckoned to become
effectively impossible to farm without a progressive increase in
debt. Of course, what is critical at any moment depends not only
on the burden of debt, but also on the rate of interest, expected
crop yields, input and output prices, asset structure and so on.
In the circumstances prevailing in 1983, the SAAU calculated the
critical debt burden for several of the largest sub-sectors as :
16,7% for summer crops! 34,1% for winter crops, 10,2% for red
meat! 17,2% for milk; and 14,2% tor wool (1984: 56).Though this
level rises by about half if non-farming income is included, the
broad standards adopted by the Union are that farmers in the
summer crop and meat sub-sectors with a debt-burden in excess of
20% should be regarded as being financially unsound, and that for
all other producers the critical burden should be 30% (1984: 58).
Against these criteria, no fewer than 15200 farmers - 22,4% of
the total - were assessed to be critical in 1983, concentrated
chiefly in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, particularly
younger farmers. The sub-sectors worst affected were summer
crops, where 52% were beyond the critical level, followed at a
distance by winter crops (22,6%). By the end of 1984, ' these
estimates were expected to have grown to 22700 farmers (33% of
the total), 65% (summer crops) and 38% (winter crops (1984: 58-
66, 86).
Since then the position would appear to have worsened: while the
average interest rate has changed little, the debt burden has
grown significantly (see Table 2,line 10), and it will be shown
that input prices have grown faster than output prices. Only
total output has improved. Estimates of the number of maize
farmers who would not survive, given conditions prevailing in
1987, put the figure at around 6000, or more than half of those
involved (Farmer's Weekly, 8 May 1987: 75) Potgieter, 1987: 5).
Confirmation of these trends is to be found in court records.
Though relatively few farms that change hands under financial
duress are actually sold on sequestration, the number of farmers
sequestrated for insolvency has risen sharply in the last three
years: whereas between 1980 and 1984 the average number of
agricultural sequestrations per year was 75, between 1985 and
1987 the average jumped to 232. In 1987, it was 313 (Central
Statistical Services, 1986: 15.23! 1988b: 10.67) and recent
reports suggest that the rate has not receded (Maize News,
September 1988: 7).
The number of sequestrations would have been far greater had it
not been for extensive state aid. Quite apart from the 'normal'
forms of financial assistance, state aid designed specifically to
alleviate the extraordinary financial pressures of the 1980s has
included subsidies on:
- the consolidation of debt (R344 m between 1981 and 1937)
- crop production loans (R470 m between 1981 and 1987)
- interest on consolidated debt and production loans (R90 in
between 1981 and 1987 with a further 'interest subsidy
equivalent to 10% of the Land Bank's interest rate on cash
credit loans to agricultural cooperatives in respect of
carry-over debts* approved for 1988-89)
- stock feed loans
- input costs for farmers in drought-stricken areas
(R120 m 'paid to creditors of farmers to help clear
production debts incurred in the 1987-88 season')
- the conversion o-f sub-marginal crop-lands to planted
pasture (R280 m budgetted -for 1987/88-1991/92)
- export losses -for summer grains, chiefly maize (up to
R200 m per annum available -from 1988).
In addition, the State stands as guarantor o-f consolidated debts
to the value o-f R900 m. Direct State aid to -farmers in its
various -forms - but excluding the indirect e-f-fects o-f tariff
protection, import control, etc. - amounted to more than R2,7
billion between 1981 and 1987. About 25000 o-f the S9000 -farmers
on the land during this period were bene-f iciaries - an average o-f
more than Rl m per recipient. The National Maize Producers'
Organisation (NAMPO) estimated that 'at least 40% o-f South
A-frica'5 grain producers would be -forced into 1 iquidation. . . i-f
State aid to -farmers was summarily withdrawn' (Farmer's Weekly,
11 September 1987: 83-84; 5 February 1988: 751 15 April 1988:
75-76; 5 August 1988: 76).
0-f the various indicators discussed in this section, arguably the
single, most comprehensive is the burden o-f debt, or the ratio o-f
total debt to total assets (see Table 2, line 10), since this
re-flects not simply the year-to-year -fluctuations in liquidity
and return on investment, but the cumulative results o-f these
-fluctuations over an extended period. Perhaps more important,
it provides a rough inverse idea o-f the capacity o-f the
agricultural sector to accumulate capital. the higher the debt
burden, the lower the capacity to accumulate, both because o-f the
increased interest and loan capital repayment drain on net
-farming Income, and because banks and other creditors as e-f-fective
part-owners o-f -farms are unliUely to want to 'plough back'
pro-fits into -farms. Even mitigated by the relative undervaluation
o-f capital in the 80s, the steady rise in the burden o-f debt over
the last decade indicates a progressive weakening D-f the capacity
of agricultural capital to accumulate. Unqualified by
undervaluation, the present debt burden o-f 27% would indicate that
the average -farmer is close to the threshhold o-f sliding into
insolvency - that is, total cessation o-f the capacity to
accumulate.
The analysis o-f the causes o-f the crisis in Section 2 -focuses on
the processes that have brought the burden of debt to its current
high level, and examines the likelihood of these processes - and
hence of the crisis In agriculture - persisting.
2. CAUSES. IMMEDIATE AND UNDERLYING
2.1 Drought
The causes of the crisis can be grouped into three broad
categories: drought; monetary policy, or more specifically, the
structure and movement of interest rates; and the deterioration
of agriculture's terms of trade with'industry. It is important to
identify not only the degree to which each has been responsible
for the crisis and the mechanisms by which this has occurred, but
also the proximity of each to the cyclical or structural end of
the spectrum.
Nearest the cyclical end is the prolonged drought of 1982-85 in
the summer rain-fall region. Rainfall has improved since 1936 and
is expected to be more -favourable in the 1990s (Tyson and Dyer,
1983: 6! Farmer's Meekly, 21 November 1986: 19-21), but the
-financial legacy o-f the drought is likely to be -felt -for some
years yet.
The. most immediate e-f-fect o-f drought is on farming income and
hence on liquidity: -for arable farmers, crop failure reduces
liquidity in the current year, while for pastoral farmers the
effect is usually delayed for a year or so by the slaughter or
sale of stock. Either way, adverse weather conditions call for
cash to build up current assets. For farmers without cash
reserves, this means additional debt. The onset of drought,
which was at its most severe in 1983 and 1984, accounts for a
substantial part of the steep rise of agricultural debt in those
years. However, the State President's Economic Advisory Council
has estimated that only 22% of the increase in farming debt
between 1980 and 1985 can be directly ascribed to drought
(Economic Advisory Council of the State President, 1986: 105).
2.2 Interest rates
Interest rates are most often expressed in 'nominal' terms, that
is, at current prices, or the rate quoted by the institution
concerned. An alternative, which has particular significance in
economic analysis, is to express them in 'real' terms, net of
inflation: the real rate of interest is therefore calculated by
deducting the current rate of inflation from the (current)
'nominal' rate of interest.
2.2.1 Treri<Js XH nominal interest rates
The second major contributor to the growth of the debt burden is
the rate of interest. Line 13 of Table 2 shows steady rise in
the average effective nominal rate, i.e. net of state subsidies,
paid by the farming sector. Though the most rapid increase
occurred between 1980 and 1982, prior to the drought, nominal
interest rates have remained on a high plateau, at or above the
1982 level, since then. The period of historically high nominal
rates therefore coincides with the prolonged drought and its
financial aftermath. Bearing in mind that the drought made it
necessary to 'consolidate' much of the sector's short-term debt,
the effect of high interest rates was to compound the growth of
farming debts at a particularly rapid rate. The State
President's Economic Advisory Council attributes 31% of the
increase in the agricultural debt burden between 1980 and 1985 to
interest rate movements (1986: 105).
Until fairly recently, one would have had little hesitation in
placing high interest rates, with drought, at the cyclical end of
the spectrum. But with high rates of inflation and a tight
balance of payments constraint expected to be more permanent
features of the economy in the foreseeable future, high nominal
interest rates may be more structural than cyclical. The
decision by the State to phase out various policies which reduced
the rate of interest payable by farmers to the Land Bank and co-
operatives, will add to this, although the practical effects of
this decision have not yet been felt. And the present high level
of direct interest subsidies paid to farmers by the State (see
Section 1), is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. High
nominal interest rates have there-fore contributed materially to
the growth o-f farming debts, at least in the 1980s, and seem
likely to do little to ease this burden in the -foreseeable
•future.
2.2.2 Irenes in reaj. interest rates
However, there is a -further, less obvious, but more fundamental
mechanism by which interest rates have influenced the debt
structure and the capacity of agriculture to accumulate capital.
The rise in nominal interest rates was accompanied in most years
by a still more rapid rise in the rate of inflation (see Table 2,
line 7), which meant that, in real terms, the rate of interest
payable by farmers was negative. As line 14 of Table 2 shows,
only in 1983 did the real rate of interest, net of State
subsidies, rise to a positive value. For most of the past two
decades, many farmers have therefore felt it sensible to
increase, rather than reduce, borrowing.This has been encouraged
further by the ready availabilty of credit from banks and
cooperatives and the basis on which income tax for farmers has
been calculated (see below), and by the relatively low cost of
credit available to farmers (see above).
Capital investment in agriculture can be divided into three main
categories: in descending order of overall magnitude, land and
fixed improvements, livestock and machinery and implements. In
respect of the first and third of these, the effect of
persistently negative real interest rates on debt and the process
of capital accumulation can be clearly discerned.
The borrowing encouraged by very low positive or negative real
interest rates has pushed land prices up, well beyond a level
commensurate with the productive capacity of land in most
regions. One of the main determinants of the price of land is the
value of the expected stream of net income -from that land
discounted at a certain rate of interest. The lower the rate of
discount, the higher the value of the income stream and the price
of the land. Persistently low real interest rates have led most
farmers to use an equally low discount rate, and hence to value
land at an inordinately high price - inordinate, that is,
relative to the real profitability of production on that tract of
land. In other words, most of the profitability of farming, at
least over the last decade and a half, has come from an
appreciation of the capital value of land, brought about not so
much by physical improvements to the land as by increases in the
price that farmers have been prepared to pay for land (of a
constant productive capacity). Put still more simply, it is
speculation in land rather than the fundamental profitability of
agricultural production that has been the main source of profit
in farming. To a large extent this has been brought about by very
low real interest rates (Janse van Rensburg, 1984).
In the present context, two consequences are worth noting*
First, the level of debt is higher than it would otherwise have
been. And second, much of the nominal capital accumulation that
has occurred is of a precarious nature. With higher real
interest rates, the financial pressures on farming intense and
the number of sequestrations rising, land prices and nominal
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capital values must be vulnerable to significant -falls.
Paradoxically, what is probably shielding farmers most at
present, is the very degree of their indebtedness. As
substantial part-owners of farms, banks are wary of precipitating
a slide in land values by accelerating the pace of legal action
against insolvent farmers. They are, to a degree, 'locked in'.
Indeed, the threat of substantial capital losses, and the range
of disruptive effects that these could have, has held up the
entire process of reconstituting the accumulation process in
agriculture.
Low real interest rates have also encouraged the purchase of
machinery and implements. Broadly speaking, mechanisation on
farms seems to have been labour-complementing prior to 1970. Few
analysts have questioned the productiveness of capital investment
of this nature. Post-1970, it seems by and large to have been
labour-substituting (Fenyes et al, 1988: 189), and there is more
doubt about its productiveness. Though the indications are not
all uniform, it seems more than probable that there has been a
degree of over-mechanisation. The Marais Commission drew
attention to this tendency in 1970 (RSA Commission of Enquiry
into Agriculture, 1970: 165); there are numerous local studies of
over-mechanisation (Fenyes et al, 1988: 190)i the SAAU's survey
of farm finances in 1983 showed that those farmers most deeply
in debt had invested twice as large a proportion of their capital
in machinery and implements as those least in debt (1984:
30), although there is some ambiguity in this; and the stock of
machinery and implements has remained more or less constant in
real terms since 1982.
Assembling the evidence, it would appear that, though there is
little direct connection between negative real interest rates and
the rapid rise of agricultural debt in the 1980s, such low real
rates have brought about a higher level of borrowing than
would otherwise have occurred. More important, they have helped
induce relatively unstable and unproductive forms of investment
which, along with changes in the terms of trade (see Section
2.3), have eroded the fundamental profitability of agricultural
production and, with it, the sector's capacity to generate a
surplus for accumulation. It is reasonable to conclude that
this, as much as any other consideration, is why the State has
begun to shift away from policies which reduce the cost of
investment in agriculture, and can be expected to pursue this
line - short-term measures notwithstanding - in the foreseeable
future.
Finally, a question arises as to why capital was so cheaply and
readily available for relatively unproductive forms of
investment. The various forms of direct interest subsidy
which, it must be remembered, are very recent - and indirect
subsidy through favoured treatment by the Land Bank and co-
operatives, have already been discussed. A change in tax
legislation in 1977 had the effect of making it still cheaper to
borrow for some purposes: farmers were granted permission to
write off the full cost of machinery and implements against
taxable income in the year of purchase (compared to a three-year
period for all other businesses). The lure of short-term tax
savings musts have outweighed the burden of longer-term debt
repayment for more than a few undiscerning farmers - before the
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weather changed in 1982. Following the Margo Commission's
recommendation, this provision is now to be scrapped.
Perhaps most important is the basis on which banks have granted
credit. Solvency) not liquidity, has been the main criterion.
In other words, loans have been granted fairly -freely against the
security of a -farmer's net assets, rather than against his
capacity to -fund interest charges and capital repayments out o-f
current income. Especially with nominal land values rising
rapidly, many -farmers have been allowed to borrow beyond this
capacity (Potgieter, 1987: 9-10). With banks now partly the
prisoners o-f their own policies, this too is starting to change.
But whatever the changes, the -financial damage o-f past policies
seems likely to remain with the agricultural sector -for many
years to come.
2.3 Terms o-f trade
2.3.1 Trends in the terms o-f trade
The most enduring cause o-f the deterioration in -farm -finances has
been the gradual but consistent adverse movement in
agriculture's terms o-f trade, that is, in the rate at which
agricultural goods exchange -for those o-f other sectors, primarily
manufacturing.The Economic Advisory Council's calculations also
suggest that it was the most significant single cause of the
increase in farming debt between 1980 and 1985, accounting for as
much as 47% of the rise (1986: 105).
There are several ways in which this rate of exchange manifests
itself. The most immediate is the domestic terms of trade, or
the ratio of farm input prices to farm output prices in South
Africa. In keeping with international trade (see Table 3,
column 8), this ratio improved significantly from farmers' point
of view at about the time of the first oil crisis in 1973. Since
then it has deteriorated almost unbrokenly. If the terms of
trade were at parity, or 1:1, in 1975, by 1986 they would have
reached a ratio of 1,37:1 (see Table 3, column 5). In other
words, If the average South African farmer had had to exchange
1000 bags of maize for, say, a tractor in 1975, by 1986 he would
have had to part with an additional 370 bags.
Agricultural output can, of course, also be sold abroad. No
composite index of the ratio of domestic input to export output
prices is published, but rough calculations for two of the
country's most important agricultural exports, maize and wool,
show similar trends. For wool, the ratio fell from 1:1 in 1975
to 1,32:1 in 1986 - close to the domestic average - whereas for
maize the drop was considerably greater, from 1:1 in 1975 to
2,09:1 in 1986, in spite of the large boost to the Rand price of
farm exports provided by the depreciation of the Rand (see Table
3, columns 5,6,9). By 1986, maize farmers would therefore have
had to export more than twice as many bags to pay for a tractor
as they would have in 1975. So, regardless of whether farm output
has been sold domestically or abroad, the terms of trade have
moved steadily against South African farmers for the last decade
and a half.
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2.3.2 Determinants of the terms of trade
Farmers attempted to o-f-fset the negative e-f-fects o-f this trend on
profits by simply producing more. This was made possible by the
extended period o-f favourable climatic conditions lasting until
1981, and was encouraged by the basis on which the prices of
several of the most important agricultural products - notably
maize and wheat - were determined. For many years now, the
prices of these commodities have been fixed annually on what
would appear to be essentially a 'cost-plus' basis by the
marketing boards concerned - although the precise method of
calculation is never disclosed. This has had two important
consequences: first, it has allowed the domestic producers'
price to escalate in line more with the rate of inflation in
South Africa than with supply and demand conditions locally and
internationally. And secondly, by placing the emphasis on a
'fair return' for farmers whatever their input costs and by
guaranteeing a fixed price whatever the size of the crop, it has
created incentives for farmers to produce more rather than more
efficiently.
At the same time that agricultural producer prices determined by
Marketing Boards have risen rapidly in South Africa, they have
tended, after the boom that accompanied the first oil crisis, to
stagnate or fall on international markets, both absolutely and
relative to the price of manufactured goods. Only recently have
they turned upward materially. The cost-advantage of South
African agricultural exports has therefore been eroded, and in
most cases eliminated. A survey in 1983 showed that of
tradeable agricultural goods that South Africa produced in
significant quantities, only the various categories of fruit,
wine, wool, mohair, karakul pelts and ostrich feathers could be
exported at a profit (Stadler et al, 1983: 14-23). Though the
subsequent sharp fall in the Rand offered temporary relief to
exporters of some other farm products, the rate of inflation in
South Africa soon counteracted that, and the position at present
is probably much as it was in 1983. It is about 10 years since
South Africa was last able to export maize at a profit.
The losses on exports engendered by this process and exacerbated
by rising output and export volumes have slowed the rise of
domestic producer prices, but not that of input prices.
Particularly in the 80s, this has been an important cause of the
widening gap in the terms of trade.
The most important contributor to the sustained rise in input
prices has undoubtedly been the general rate of inflation in
South Africa. The establishment and protection of import
substitution industries has added to this: it was estimated in
1982 that the cost of intermediate inputs (cattle feed,
fertilizer, fuel, etc.) was 6,9% higher than it would have been
under tariff-free international trade (Stadler et al, 1983: 6).
The effect on the costs of capital inputs, whose life extends
•ver several years, is more difficult to assess, but the same
study estimated that over the 10 year 'phasing-in period' of
Atlantis Diesel Engines from 1982, the 'tractor bill' would be
16% higher than it would otherwise have been (Stadler et al,
1983: 12-13).
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It is rather surprising then, that, on balance, agriculture has
probably gained rather than lost from industrial protection. The
reason is the growing degree of protection afforded to
agricultural outputs. Without tariffs and import controls but
including transport costs, Stadler et al estimated that consumers
would have paid R916 m less -for the same volume of agricultural
output than they actually did in 1982, as against an additional
cost to -farmers of R221 m from the protection of intermediate
inputs (plus a small additional amount on capital inputs). This
increased the value added by agriculture by 19,4%. Most
significantly, Stadler et al point out how the degree of net
protection of agriculture has grown as the competitiveness of
South African farmers has declined (1983: 24-25). Without State
intervention to protect industries, the adverse movement in
agriculture's terms of trade would therefore have been still
greater.
The overall impact of State intervention on the terms of trade
can be summed up as follows: the manner in which key output
prices have been fixed and the net protection of outputs have
brought about a more rapid increase in domestic producer prices
than would otherwise have occurred. Intentionally or not, this
has helped slow the deterioration in agriculture's terms of
trade. But the export losses induced in the process have, at
least for the present, placed a ceiling on the capacity of these
policies to limit the rate of deterioration.
The most fundamental determinants of the terms of trade in the
long term are the relative rates of change of supply and demand
for different categories of goods. In relation to manufactured
goods, the international supply of agricultural goods has
expanded more rapidly than demand over the last decade and a
half, leading to a fall in the relative price of the latter.
With some qualifications, similar trends can be identified in
South Africa. The details are worth examining briefly because of
their implications for future trends.
The global supply of agricultural commodities has expanded
comparatively rapidly in the 70s and 80s for a number of reasons,
the two most important of which are technological advance and the
increased emphasis on agricultural self-sufficiency in many
countries (Schuh, 1986). The former has been a significant
enabling factor for the latter, particularly in less
industrialised countries, but other, primarily economic,
mechanisms have also been employed to achieve self-sufficiency.
These include the protection of domestic agriculture by tariffs
and import controls and the use of price incentives, notably
export subsidies, to stimulate production behind these barriers.
The result has been that countries which for many years have been
substantial importers of agricultural commodities, chiefly
grains, have now become either marginal importers or exporters.
India, China and the European Community are the most important
examples (Groenewald, 1987a: 200-201! 1987b: 226-223). And of
the present major importers, Dnly Japan appears certain to remain
a major importer (van der Vyver, 1988: 303-304).
On the demand side, several developments have acted to slow the
growth of consumption. The population growth rate is falling in
most parts of the world except Africa. The demand for
agricultural goods is, in general, income-inelastic: that is, as
incomes rise, the proportion spent on food tends to fall (even
though total spending on -food may increase). And the industrial
demand -for agricultural raw materials appears to be weakening
(Groenewald, 1987b: 226).
The combined effect of these forces has been to lower the
relative price of farm outputs, as the rough index in Table 3
(column 8) shows. It is chiefly the depreciation of the Rand
that has kept the Rand price of exported maize increasing (Table
3, column 3), and, to lesser degree, the same is true of
exported wool too.
Though commodity markets are notoriously unstable - the price of
grains has increased dramatically with the current American
drought - most indicators suggest a continuation of the decline
in the terms of trade of agricultural goods on world markets in
the medium to long term. There is no shortage of technological
capability; population growth rates are unlikely to rise! the
'hierarchy of needs' which makes the demand for food income-
inelastic is unlikely to change! and countries which have gained
or regained agricultural self-sufficiency will, for the most
part, be reluctant to lose this capacity, especially if they have
balance of payments problems. Only a significant movement
towards freer international trade in agricultural commodities,
involving less competitive subsidization of farm production,
appears capable of reversing the trend, environmental calamities
excepted.
Within South Africa, the supply-demand relationship is more
ambiguous and is complicated by foreign trade. A very rough
approximation for the growth of domestic demand for agricultural
commodities can be obtained by multiplying the rate of growth Df
real national income by the income-elasticity of demand for food
(since no estimate of the latter for agricultural commodities as
a whole is available, and food, in any case, makes up the bulk of
agricultural output). The resulting average annual growth rate
Df demand for the period 1970-1985 varies between 0,79% and
1,76%, depending on one's choice of elasticity estimate.
(Groenewald, 1987b: 231 ; SA Reserve Bank, September 1978: 572 ;
March 1980: 575 i March 1985: 578 ; June 1988: 583). The latter
is the more likely, given the high population growth rate. Over
the same period, the physical index of food production grew at
an average annual rate of 2,19% (RSA Department of Agriculture,
1989: 82). These are really only the crudest of indicators, but
the results do lend support to the argument that supply has
tended to grow faster than demand.
A conclusion to-this effect needs qualifying at least by the fact
that the market for domestically-produced agricultural goods is
not closed. While agricultural imports make up only a small
proportion of domestic consumption, exports form a very
significant component of demand. Much the most important export
commodities in a typical year are maize, fruit, sugar and wool.
As noted earlier, maize has been exported at a loss for the last
ten or more years, so domestic supply cannot have been increased
for the export market. A similar conclusion must be arrived at
for sugar, whose export price has been well belDW the domestic
price for an extended period. In the case of fruit and wool,
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domestic supply responds largely to international demand, only a
small portion of output being marketed locally. So for these
commodities, it cannot be argued that a domestic over-supply
situation has arisen, although, as with all exports, this could
change radically i-f trade sanctions were effectively imposed.
With some qualifications, therefore, it would appear that the
strong growth of agricultural supply relative to demand has been
an important underlying cause of the steady shift of the terms of
trade against agriculture in South Africa for the past IS years.
With the outlook for exports generally less than favourable and
limited scope for import substitution, a sustained improvement in
agriculture's terms Df trade is unlikely in the medium term, not
only internationally but also within the domestic economy - the
counter-trend of 1988 notwithstanding.
This finding puts the adverse trend in the terms of trade nearer
the structural end of the spectrum of causes of the build-up of
farming debt.
To sun up: it appears that of the three major sets of causes of
the current crisis, only one - drought - is likely to be of short
duration. The higher current incomes from improvements in the
weather and the short-run terms of trade will certainly help to
stabilize the burden of debt, and there are indications that this
is already occurring. But there is reason to believe that the
unfavourable trends of the other two - interest rates and the
terms of trade - will resume or persist for some years, which
makes a rapid reduction of the burden Df debt unlikely. The
capacity of agriculture to accumulate will therefore probably
remain at low levels. Indeed, the prolonged relative decline in
agricultural commodity prices is a strong signal to shift
resources out of agriculture. Some far-sighted farmers have been
willing to do this on their own. But for most less-efficient
producers, the process - which now appears well-established in
South Africa - has been and will continue to be both involuntary
and painful.
Ultimately, it is to State policy to keep white farmers on the
land - in its many forms - that much of the cause of the present
crisis must be ascribed. It is beyond the scope of this article
to investigate the motives for this policy, but party-political
and 'security' interests come immediately to mind. And, needless
to say, farmers themselves have been the most vociferous
supporting lobby. For more than just the period of this study,
the level of investment in agriculture has exceeded what is
justifiable on purely economic grounds. But it has taken the
events of the 70s and 80s to raise the costs - both economic and
political - to the level at which the policy has become
unsustainable. Seen in these terms, the crisis through which
agriculture is now passing should be regarded as a healthy
development, where 'crisis' should be identified more closely
with 'restructuring' than with "catastrophe' - though large parts
of the farming community might not perceive it in this light.
Section 3 explores the implications.
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE AND WIDER ECONOMY
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A wide range of implications follows -from the present crisis.
3.1 agricultural production
Perhaps the most -far-reaching o+ these is that the rate of
growth o-f domestic -farm output can be expected to slow down,
possibly even becoming negative) -for much D-f the coining decade.
Several decelerating influences are at work. First, there is the
strong price signal referred to in Section 2.3.2 - to shift
resources out of agriculture. Farmers are much more aware of
this signal now than they were at the end of the 70s. More
important, State policy is now taking the long decline in the
terms of trade into account. Moves to discourage inefficient
forms of investment were discussed in Section 2.2.2, but the most
significant shift is in the basis on which the major grain prices
are determined. The first indications came in the early 80s, when
maize producer price increases started to become less sensitive
to input price increases. However, the fixed single-price policy
was maintained, which, as was pointed out in Section 2.3.2,
created a perfectly elastic demand curve and still encouraged
maximum output at the ruling price. Very recently, however, the
Wheat Board (Farmer's Weekly, IS April 1988: 75) and the Maize
Board (Farmer's Weekly, 9 September 1988: 68) have made it known
that the producer price for next season will vary inversely with
the size of the crop, with the highest prices - still well below
the present price in the case of maize - being paid only for
deliveries that leave little or no surplus for export. Though
the price-elasticity of the Boards' demand curves is greater than
unity, so that the total revenue received by farmers collectively
will still increase with the size of the crop, the incentive to
try to beat the decline in the terms of trade by expanding output
is now very much less than before.
The policy for the foreseeable future would appear to be to try
to limit output to a little above the level of domestic consumption.
For maize, this will mean a drop of about 20% on the average
year's production (between 1977 and 1987). For wheat, it will
mean holding output levels steady at the 11-year average, which
may not be easy with many maize farmers wanting to move into
wheat production.
The main alternative for marginal maize farmers is to plant
pastures, and the State has offered financial assistance to those
undertaking the change. But there is little scope for import
substitution in most animal product sub-sectors. In the red meat
market, only about 6% of local consumption has been imported
annually over the last 11 years. On the other hand, studies
suggest that the domestic demand for most sorts of meat - and
hence for yellow maize as a stockfeed - would expand fairly
rapidly if prices were reduced (Groenewald, 1987b: 232-3).
The market for wool and mohair is effectively unlimited since
most of South Africa's output is exported. But the transition
would be costly for most farmers, and it is not clear whether
wool Dr mohair production could be undertaken profitably on
planted pastures. There is also the additional uncertainty of
trade sanctions hanging Dver exported commodities. Indeed, those
sub-sectors which rely heavily on exports - wool, mohair, almost
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all types of fruits and fruit products and, to a lessen degree,
sugar, hides and skins - would be in a far worse position than
the maize industry if trade sanctions Mere made effective. The
only comfort for farmers, in the absence of a substantial
depreciation of the Rand or an unexpectedly sustained
strengthening of international agricultural commodity prices, is
that the State is most unlikely to risk the capacity for self-
sufficiency by lowering the protection they presently receive.
With certain qualifications, then, the growth of agricultural
production seems likely, at most, to be slow over the medium
term. This, in - turn, has a number of consequences - for
employment, wages and the degree of industrial concentration in
agriculture and dependent sub-sectors; and for the gross
domestic product, the balance of payments and population
distribution in the wider economy.
3. 2 Agr ic uiiur aj. employment, wages and industrial concentration
Employment in agriculture has been on an erratic downward trend
since the late '60s. Reliable and comparable data are hard to
come by, but farm employment has fallen from about 1,6 million in
1968 to about 1,3 million at present (RSA Department of
Agricultural Economics and Marketing, 1989: 4 ). Technological
change and the growth in the average size of farming units have
probably been the main causes of the decline. It was argued in
Section 2.2.2 that little further substitution of capital for
labour can be expected in farming in the next few years. On the
other hand, there are also indications that any fall in the real
wages of farm-workers that may occur during this period is
unlikely to lead to a significant substitution of labour for
capital (van Zyl, 1986: 69). But the average size of farming
units will almost certainly continue to rise with the financial
pressures that agriculture is currently experiencing. Many
smaller farms are likely to be incorporated into larger units in
an attempt tD generate economies of scale. More often than not,
this involves the retrenchment of workers on the smaller farm.
While it was seasonal workers who bore the brunt of
mechanization, it is permanent workers who are most directly
affected by the process Df farm consolidation (de Klerk, 1985:
14-15).
Another negative influence on farm employment is the switch from
arable to pastoral farming in marginal arable areas. Pastoral
farming generally employs fewer workers per hectare. All of
these factors, along with the slow-down anticipated in
production, will weaken the demand for agricultural labour.
For this reason most workers who remain on farms are unlikely to
see their real wages rising noticeably. Those with skills which
are readily marketable in urban areas, such as truck-drivers, may
be an exception (de Klerk, 1985: 20), and attempts to pre-empt
the growth of unions may improve the wages and working and living
conditions of others. But, in general, one would expect a weak
trend in real wages. This, together with a similar trend in on-
farm employment, will increase the degree to which farm residents
already rely on off-farm income (de Klerk, 1934: 47-43!
Seleoane, 1984). If anti-squatter legislation is used to drive
members of extended families off farms, the result will be a
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marked -fall in income -for those who are allowed to stay,
irrespective of wage rates. It is also worth noting that
salaries and wages now -form a comparatively small part o-f total
costs - about 13% in 1987 (R.S.A. Central Statistical Services,
1988c: 2) - so that lower real wage rates will probably not
reduce output prices significantly or have any material effect on
the competitiveness of exports.
Developments in agriculture will have an impact on industries
directly dependent on farming - input manufacturers and output
processors - and on the many small-town activities that exist
primarily to service the farming community. The agricultural
input industry is likely to remain in the doldrums as its market
contracts or grows only very slowly. Attendant developments
would be a transfer of capital out of the industry, increasing
concentration of ownership, and weak employment and wage trends -
some of which have already started to occur, in particular in
fertilizer and farm machinery manufacturing. Disinvestment by
foreign input suppliers has a sound economic basis. In some
instances, this has led to a rather unusual form of vertical
integration - the purchase of input manufacturing firms by
agricultural co-operatives. Whether farmers will be any more
successful in controlling rising input costs thereby remains to
be seen.
In general, with so many members in financial ill-health and
heavily indebted to co-operatives, and with the advantage of
subsidized funding by the Land Bank diminishing, one would expect
the co-operative movement to be on the retreat. Some weaker
groups have already merged with stronger ones, and others have
formed partnerships with firms in the private sector.
Agricultural output processors who are orientated towards export,
such as fruit canners, are in a vulnerable position. Employment
and wages in such firms will depend largely on the imposition
and effectiveness of trade sanctions. Those who produce
primarily for the domestic market are comparatively secure, but,
like most of agriculture, are limited by the rate of growth of
this market.
The widest group affected by developments in agriculture are the
many employers and workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors
in small towns throughout the platteland whose livelihood depends
on demand from the farming community. Industrial
decentralization and mining will make growth possible in some
instances, but in most others the outlook for employment is less
than favourable. In fact, as the comments on changes in
population distribution below suggest, there are indications of
an increase in the rate of unemployment in rural towns, not only
amongst urban workers but also amongst those formerly employed on
farms (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989: 88-89). In the Cape, where
the majority of farm workers are 'coloured', this is a well-
established phenomenon, but in the northern provinces, the
recent relaxation of influx control may be starting to increase
the number of black work-seekers in this category too.
Paradoxically, the relatively high risks and low profits of
agricultural production may also open up some opportunities which
have long-term significance. In the sugar industry, for
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instance, existing large-scale producers appear to be shifting
their emphasis towards the more stable activities of milling and
marketing and encouraging the growth of the already substantial
numbers of small part-time cane producers, who are mostly black.
Not only input prices, but also retail food prices have moved
well ahead of the producer prices received by farmers, especially
in the 80s, while producers' share of consumer value has tended
to fall - particularly in the case of sugar (RSA Department Df
Agricultural Economics and Marketing, 1989: 99). This is the
essential reason for a rather surprising general trend: the
increasing concentration of -farm ownership evident since the
1950s has, in most sub-sectors, not been accompanied by a similar
increase in the penetration of industrial capital into farm-
operating, ultimately because industrial capital has found it
more remunerative to take its profit at other points in the
agricultural production chain. As was pointed out in Section
2.2.2, the most profitable aspect of owning a farm has generally
not been in operating it, but in the long-term appreciation of
the value of the land - though even this is far from assured in
the foreseeable future. Since most firms need to show an
acceptable annual trading profit, capital appreciation of this
nature is not generally a sufficient attraction, despite being
less taxable when it is finally taken. With the number of
sequestrations rising, banks may temporarily become the owners of
more farms, but if farm ownership was unattractive to industrial
capital in the past, it will, over the next few years, become
even more so. The age of monopoly capitalism in South African
agriculture is not on the doorstep.
The growth of part-time farming is not con-fined only to small-
scale sugar producers. In other sectors, such as grain and
livestock production, full-time farmers are becoming or being
replaced by part-timers (SAAU, 1984: 35). Though not as efficient
as full-time operating (Nel et al, 1987: 25), part-time farming
diversifies assets and income sources, thereby reducing risk, and
increases liquidity. About 15% of farmers were part-timers in
1983 (SAAU, 1984: 33), and in current circumstances this
percentage is likely to increase. One noteworthy consequence of
this trend is the increase in the number of black farm managers,
or their equivalents, that must be occurring, though few such
positions would involve the acquisition of essential financial
skills.
In this context, one other probable consequence of the financial
pressures on farmers can be identified, namely, an increase in
the occurrence of covert black tenancy on marginal and sub-
marginal commercial farmland - as well as the need perceived by
financially stronger farmers and the State for more stringent
rural anti-squatter legislation.
What each of these developments have in common is that they
expand the core of potential - and in some cases actual - black
commercial farmers. ,
3• 3 £±±ec_t s on £he w^der ecoriom^
For the wider economy, the crisis in agriculture also has both
negative and positive aspects. On the negative side,agriculture's
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relative contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) cannot be
expected to grow from the present 5 or 6% and, more likely, will
continue to wane. This will increase the economy's dependence on
urban employment and urban -facilities and services - a pattern
observable in most industrializing countries. The expected
decline in -foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports
will also have a negative effect on GDP growth through tightening
the balance o-f payments constraint. I-f only commodities
presently exported at a loss are a-f-fected and exports are reduced
to a very low level, total foreign exchange earnings might not
fall by more than 2 or 3%. Of course, if trade sanctions were
effectively imposed, the impact would be far greater. Trade and
industrial classifications make it difficult to calculate the
contribution of agriculture to exports accurately, but in the
early 80s it was still of the order of 20%.
There are the makings of a vicious circle in this relationship.
In the past, agriculture has relied heavily on foreign demand for
output growth. In the foreseeable future, domestic demand will
play an increasingly important role. So not only will a slowdown
in agricultural production have a negative effect on GDP growth,
but the latter will also have a negative effect Dn the former.
On the other hand, these developments are not without some
positive aspects. Diminishing export markets and greater
emphasis on the need to balance domestic demand and supply growth
will help reduce the rate of increase of food prices. This should
benefit the urban population and, by easing upward wage
pressures, assist the growth of urban employment.
Also, directly or indirectly, capital is being released from
relatively unproductive uses (in agriculture) for deployment
elsewhere. However, this is a very difficult process to trace
and it is almost impossible to tell whether more productive use
of such resources is, in fact, being made. At least some
agricultural capital is likely to move abroad so as to bypass
sanctions, thereby nullifying any benefit to domestic employment.
One further group of effects is on population distribution. It
can be safely predicted that the substantial outflow from
'white' farms will continue. Until recently, most farm families
have had to move to the 'homelands', from which work-seekers have
had to migrate to urban areas. This has added significantly,
though possibly unintentionally, to State-engineered population
relocation. The resulting increase in population pressure in
black rural areas is making the prospects of raising agricultural
productivity in these areas ever more remote.
With the relaxation of influx control, an increasing proportion
of farm leavers is likely to move directly to urban areas, often
initially to rural towns. As already noted, the latter is
widespread amongst 'coloured* farmer farm-workers in the Cape and
may now be becoming so amongst black work-seekers in the other
provinces. Small-town facilities will often be inadequate tD
cope with such an influx. Together with the slow or negative
growth of white residents, this will increase the pressure to de-
segregate or transfer access to 'whites only' facilities to
another 'population group', accompanied in many instances by an
increase in white conservatism.
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4. SUMMARY ANfi CONCLUSIONS
Commercial agriculture is currently under great -financial
pressure, probably greater than at any time since the 1930s. This
pressure is manifested in low rates o-f return on investment ( or
low profitability ), low levels of liquidity and a steady build-
up of debt.The most significant impact of these trends has been
on the agricultural stock: despite the many forms of state
assistance to agriculture, the real capital stock in commercial
farming appears to have risen little, if at all, over the past
two decades, and the proportion of this stock owned by farmers
has tended to decline. The average farmer has become less willing
or less able to increase or, in many cases, even to maintain the
real level of his investment in agriculture. Capital accumulation
in agriculture has clearly entered a critical phase.
The roots of the crisis can be traced, on the one hand, to
factors which have induced uneconomically high levels of
investment in the past, namely, state agricultural policy,
negative real interest rates over extended periods and banks
lending policies. In varying degrees, all three seem now to be
changing, constituting less of an inducement to invest than
before. On the other hand, a distinct.but not unrelated group of
factors - drought, high nominal interest rates and the prolonged
adverse trend in agriculture's terms of trade - has made further
investment more difficult by distending the burden of debt
carried by farmers. But what is most significant about this group
of factors is that with the exception of drought, there is reason
to believe that they are less cyclical than structural. Interest
rates in the foreseeable future, are likely to remain higher both
because of the withdrawal of most forms of state interest subsidy
and because of shifts in macro monetary policy. And the terms of
trade will probably continue to deteriorate gradually - short
term improvements notwithstanding - ultimately because, on an
international scale, one can expect supply in the medium term to
continue to grow rather faster than demand.
The prognosis is, therefore, that commercial agriculture will
remain a comparatively unrewarding area of investment. In net
terms, capital is unlikely to accumulate in, or flow into,
agriculture in significant quantities for some years, though
there will always be sub-sectoral exceptions.
For the rural economy, the most important projected trends are a
slower rate of growth of farm ou'.i^ i. :he further conscl idation
of large farming units and the transfer of marginal arable land
employment and keep real wages from rising on farms and in small
towns. On smaller farms, the increase in the number of part-time
farm-operators can be expected to continue.
For the economy as a whole, there is likely to be a continued
decline in the relative contribution of agriculture to the gross
domestic product, a loss of foreign exchange earnings on
agricultural exports and an unstemmed flow of rural workseekers
and their families into urban areas. More positively, the prices
of foodstuffs ought to rise less rapidly, reducing the pressure on
urban incomes and assisting urban employment growth.
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However, all Df this overlooks one other set of consequences,
which are no more than nascent at present but which have the
potential to bring about -far-reaching changes production
structures and the composition of the -farming population. The
same market -forces which are making agricultural production less
attractive to many existing white -farmers are starting to
generate a core o-f actual or potential black,'coloured* and Asian
commercial or semi-commercial -farmers, through at least three
distinct channels. First, in the sugar industry large vertically
integrated producers are encouraging small black producers to
take over a share o-f the relatively high risk, low-return
operation o-f cane--farming. Second, in' other sub-sectors part-time
-farming is not only spreading risks and generating additional
cash -flows -for white -farmers but is also transferring
responsibi lty -for day-to-day production activities to what are
e-f-fectively black farm -foremen/managers. And third - though this
is hard to trace on the ground - the logic of current
circumstances dictates that some marginal and sub-marginal
commercial -farmland is probanly being rented covertly to black
tenants.
It is also possible that a -fourth channel is opening up: scraps
o-f evidence suggest that some - probably isolated - going
commercial -farms are being taken over by 'racially disqualified'
-farmers. Mechanisms -for such transfers do exist in terms o-f the
Group Areas Act, but it is not clear whether these are being used
or whether there is under-the-counter circumvention of the law,
such as is widely practised in urban areas.
What is perhaps most significant about these processes is that
they are all being driven by market rather than political forces.
And, as was argued in section 2, the essential direction of these
forces appears to likely to remain the same in the foreseeable
future. The core of actual and potential black, 'coloured' and
Asian commercial farmers can therefore be expected to continue to
grow. In the absence of the repeal of the Land Acts and the Group
Areas Act, this will constitute the cutting edge of
deracialization in agriculture.
If it is not out of order to speculate a little, one might
suggest that, realizing the need for the emergence of a black
commercial farming class but fearful of the conservative attitude
of most of white commercial farmers, a National Party government
will - as in urban areas - probably retain the main body of
legislation which presently defines land rights in racial terms,
but seek ways of accommodating the market forces which are
carrying forward the process of deracialization - what one might
call a policy of 'managing the shift of the black-white
frontier'.
One element of such a policy would be for the.state to purchase
parcels of land which it would demarcate for use by groups of
Individual black farmers or farming communities. Depending on the
locality and potential of the land, a variety of schemes could be
tried. But it is not unreasonable to assume that commercial
agriculture will continue to be dominated by a relatively small
group of large farmers, who together will produce the
overwhelming bulk of output. Entry to this group will in the
future, depend less on race classification and more on access to
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capital.
This identifies a crucial constraint: what will initially hinder
the emergence of a class o-f smaller black producers most is
access to capital. For the many black potential -farmers in this
positon, tenancy, in its many -forms, offers a way forward. One of
the most important tasks to which the government will have to
attend is the design and operationalization of a system or
systems of tenancy which will be attractive both to land-owners
and to tenants. This will, in effect, mobilize 'white capital'
for use by black entrepreneurs - a key component in any strategy
tD preserve the market basis of the economy.
Clearly none of this is imminent. Nor is the widespread collapse
of commercial farming as it presently exists. If the term
'crisis' is to be correctly understood, for those individual
farmers and farm-workers who have already been or who are in
immediate danger of being displaced, it should indeed convey a
sense of catastrophe. But for the agricultural sector as a whole
and for the wider economy, it describes a combination of
developments which are starting to provide the Impetus for the
restructuring, in part of agricultural marketing, but, more
fundamentally, of agricultural production in South Africa. The
winds of change are blowing on the platteland.
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APPENDIX A.
VALUING THE AGRICULTURAL STOCK
There are -few variables in economic analysis as important but as
problematic to measure as the capital stock. The importance, in
this instance, lies in the dependence o-f many of the Indicators
in Table 2 on the value attached to the agricultural capital
stock. Assessment o-f the extent , nature and Implications o-f the
'crisis' in agriculture hinges, in turn, on the values calculated
-for these indicators. Some discussion o-f the problems o-f
valuing the capital stock is there-fore required. The
difficulties arise -from two sources: techniques o-f valuation and
data.
The Department o-f Agricultural Economics and Marketing divides
the stock of capital on farms into -four categories : land, -fixed
improvements, machinery and implements, and livestock. In respect
o-f the '-fixed capital' items <-fixed Improvements and machinery
and implements ), the technique o-f valuation adopted here
despite some arguable shortcomings - is the 'perpetual inventory
method' used by both the Department and the South African Reserve
Bank. A full description is to be found in de Jager (1973). The
details relevant at this point are as follows:
- the rate of depreciation allowed for machinery and equipment
was 10% p.at for fixed improvements the rate was 1% p.a.
until 1982 and 2% p.a. thereafter - this 'inflates' the estimates
of the earlier period marginally (by less than 0,1% of the total
value of capital stock),
- the real fixed capital component of the total real capital stock
(Table 2, line 9) was calculated at constant 1980 prices, using
the price indices for the respective components calculated by
the Department.
This is the least controversial aspect of the calculation.
The current value of livestock is calculated by the Department by
multiplying the August quarterly head-count of the various
categories of livestock by the respective indices , compiled from
auction prices. (The Reserve Bank accepts this valuation.) In the
absence of details for each category, the real value of livestock
( at 1980 prices) included in the real capital stock (Table 2,
line 9) was estimated by adjusting the total current value of
livestock by the combined weighted index of the producer prices
of livestock products, published by the Department. Any bias
inherent in this method is probably small.
More serious is the bias generated by excluding the value of
livestock in the ' independent black states' as from 1978. The
•real value of livestock' series estimated as Just described,
shows a sudden fall of 22% - or nearly Rl billion - between 1977
and 1978. At most, only a fraction of this is likely to have been
caused by destocking In 'white rural areas'. The resultant
relative 'inflation' of the pre-1978 total real capital stock
from this source is probably of the order of 3 % .
Most difficult of the four asset categories is 'land' - not
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strictly part of 'capital' in the neoclassical sense, but much
the largest single asset -for most -farmers and there-fore essential
to include in any meaningful estimate o-f the capital stock.
( 'Land' makes up about two-thirds o-f the total asset value of the
'average -farm'. ) Until the late 70s, when much of the
information -for the annual agricultural census was collected by
individual interview and the results were thought to be
relatively reliable, the Department simply summed -farmers'
estimates o-f the marUet value o-f their land to obtain an estimate
o-f the total value of land. Since the, however, census data have
been collected by mail. Predictably, the data-collection rate has
been too low to allow reasonable estimates of the total market
value of land to be made from this source.
In the absence of this input, the Department has fallen back on
adjusting the market value of land by the combined index of rural
land prices compiled by the Central Statistical Services on the
basis of transfers of rural immovable property. Consequently, the
'real value of land' - as calculated by deflating the market
value by the relevant price index - has remained more or less
constant in the 1980s, with a single downward adjustment of
exactly RSOOm (at 1980 prices) occurring between 1982 and 1983.
However, what makes estimation of the real capital stock still
more difficult is the fall of no less than 35% in the real value
of land - calculated on the basis Just described - that took
place between 1979 and 1981. This decline of about R8 billion (at
1980 prices) shows up as a 25% reduction in the value of the
total real capital stock (from R31359 million to R24805 million)
between 1979 and 1981. A decrease of this magnitude is too great
to be credible, especially given that these were exceptionally
good agricutural years in most parts of South Africa. A small
part of this can be explained by the 15% fall in the area of land
under tree and field crops between 1976 and 1981 and the transfer
of this land to pastoral production. This can be assumed to have
led to the depreciation of land values in the areas concerned.
But, this apart, one cannot avoid the conclusion that there is a
major inconsistency in the measurement of the value of land.
In respect of all the categories of asset, other than machinery
and implements (which is the smallest of the four by value), it
must therefore be concluded that there has been a relative
undervaluation in recent years. Which part of the.series is the
more reliable, it is hard to say.
Allowing for the disjunctions that either certainly or probably
occurred shortly before or after 1960, the most that can
reasonably be said about the real capital stock (as recorded in
Table 2, line 9) is that it has probably changed little over the
nearly two decades of the study, fluctuating narrowly around the
R2S billion level (at 1980 prices). The apparent rise that took
place between 1974 and 1979 and the subsequent sharp fall should
be regarded with caution.
In respect of the indicators in Table 2, the relative
undervaluation of capital in the 1980s implies:
- a relative overstatement of all of the nominal and real rates
of return on assets and owners' equity (lines 1-4) in the
1980s,
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- a relative understatement of the nominal and real net worth of
the farmers (lines 3, 8) in the 1980s,
- a relative overstatement of the burden of debt of agriculture
(line 10) in the 1980s,
- a relative understatement of the capital:output ratio (line 15)
in the 1980s.
The implications of these inconsistencies are explored in the text.
Finally, Flske (1968, personal communication) draws attention to
a number of factors which lead to a persistent undervaluation of
agricultural capital by the Department of Agricultural Economics
and Marketing:
- although relatively little agricultural production is
undertaken by large corporations in South Africa, a more-than-
negligible percentage of capital assets in the farming sector
is owned by such corporations and by state and semi-state
bodies. While deliveries of produce from these sources are
included in 'gross farming income', the greatest part of
their farming assets escapes measurement.
- as members of co-operatives, farmers own the reserves of co-
operatives, but this is not counted as an asset. Similarly, the
reserves held by Control Boards on behalf of farmers are not
included in farming assets.
- crops on the land, stored produce, stocks of intermediate
inputs and various other inventory items are ignored in the
valuation of assets.
The indicator for which these particular shortcomings are most
important is the burden of debt. If capital is undervalued,
insolvency, for heavily indebted farmers, will appear more
imminent than it actually is. This qualification should be borne
in mind in the discussion of solvency in the text. There is no
immediate reason to suppose that the downward bias was more
serious in one period rather than another. Trends, as opposed to
levels, are probably not significantly affected by this last
group of errors.
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APPENDIX I
1. Sources: RSA Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing,
1989: 104| personal communications with the Department,
April 1989.
2. Short term debt (col. 8) defined as loans -from commercial
banks and agricultural cooperatives.
3. Total debt 1989: preliminary estimate by Department of
Agricultural Economics and Marketing.
2
1. Net nominal rate of return on assets less rate of inflation.
2. Net nominal rate of return on owners' equity less rate of
Inflation.
3. Calculated from: SA Reserve Bank, 1980: S65; 1981: S79| 1988:
S80I Central Statistical Services, 1988a: 5) 1989:6.
4. Year-on-year change of Consumer Price Index.
5. Real capital stock (line 9) less real debt. Real capital stock
and real debt calculated at 1980 prices. Real debt adjusted by
Consumer Price Index. For real capital stock, see Appendix A.
6. See Appendix A.
7. Average real Interest rate less rate of Inflation,
lable 2
1. Sources: - columns 1 and 2: RSA Department of Agricultural
Economics and Marketing, 1988: 90, 97.
- columns 3 and 4: calculated from International
Monetary Fund, 1977: 44,461 1978: 35,371 1981:
51,53; 1984: 71,73| 1988: 81,83) and from SA Reserve
Bank, 1980: S80. Assumed: international maize price
- current wholesale price, Chicago! international
WODI price - wholesale price Australia/New Zealand,
UK 64s price.
- column 8: International Monetary Fund, 1986: 201.
Assumed: U.S. export unit values for manufactured
goods and crude foods.
- column 9: S.A. Reserve Bank, 1980: S65| 1981: S79J
1988: S80.
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